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COOPER SUPREMACY 
Rebecca E. Zietlow* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Cooper v. Aaron,1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
articulated a doctrine of judicial supremacy to justify the role of federal 
courts as protectors of the rights of minorities.2 In Cooper, the Court 
reaffirmed its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education3 that state laws 
mandating racial segregation in public schools violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Cooper responded to State of 
Arkansas officials who had rejected that mandate and flouted the Court’s 
influence. Prior to Brown and Cooper, progressives had been wary of the 
Court’s approach to individual rights. During the early part of the nineteenth 
century, the Court had primarily used its power to strike down laws that 
progressives supported. In Cooper, the Court asserted two propositions that 
were essential to protecting civil rights: that the Court was committed to 
protecting those rights, and that it would assert all of its power to do so.5 
In the ensuing decade, the Warren Court issued numerous rulings 
expanding minority rights,6 increasing access to the federal courts for civil 
rights plaintiffs,7 and upholding the constitutionality of federal civil rights 
statutes.8 As a result, liberals embraced the doctrine of judicial supremacy 
and the view that the federal courts were the primary protectors of minority 
rights. Liberals’ embrace of judicial supremacy in the 1960s stood in sharp 
contrast to the attitudes towards the Court held by progressives since the 
Reconstruction Eraviewing the Court as a threat to individual rights, not a 
 
*Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law. 
Thanks so much to Shelby Howlett, Allison Tschiemer, and all of the editors of the 
University of Arkansas Little Rock Law Review, to Dean Theresa Beiner for inviting me to 
participate in this symposium, and to all of the other participants in this symposium. It was 
truly a pleasure to be in this symposium, and to learn from the other participants. 
 1. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 2. Id. at 18. 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See infra Section IV.A. 
 7. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 8. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
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champion of those rights.9 By contrast, progressives viewed the Warren 
Court as a champion of minority rights.10 However, in recent years, the 
Court has reverted to its previous role, using its supreme power to strike 
down laws that protect minority rights.11 Indeed, with the Court’s new 
entrenched conservative majority, Cooper supremacy presents a threat to the 
rights of minorities with few limits on the Court’s power. 
Cooper supremacy is marked by two themes. First, the Court is the 
supreme expositor of constitutional law. Second, the Court uses that power 
to enforce the civil rights of minorities. In Cooper, the Warren Court 
provided an answer to the counter-majoritarian difficulty posed by the 
unelected judiciary overturning acts of the politically elected branches.12 The 
Warren Court used Cooper supremacy to protect the rights of minorities 
against the tyranny of the majority.13 Following Cooper, Warren Court 
rulings enforcing the civil rights of minorities appeared to vindicate liberal 
support of expansive Supreme Court power. The Warren Court expanded 
access to federal courts by civil rights plaintiffs and broadly enforced those 
rights. Using Cooper supremacy, members of the Court acted as “counter-
majoritarian heroes,” protecting the rights of minorities and opening the 
federal courts as sites of redress for minority plaintiffs seeking to vindicate 
their rights.14 At the same time, the Warren Court deferred to the acts of the 
coordinate federal branches as they also enforced the civil rights of 
minorities.15 
Since the Warren Court, Cooper supremacy has governed the Court’s 
exercise of judicial review. Unfortunately, the Court no longer relies on that 
supremacy to protect minority rights. Instead, the Court has backed away 
from protecting the rights of minorities, restricting the federal courts’ 
authority to protect civil rights and narrowing the meaning of those rights. 
First the Burger Court and then the Rehnquist Court invoked federalism and 
 
 9. See LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES 
COMPROMISE 53 (2016) (discussing the National Civil Liberties Board’s, a successor to the 
American Civil Liberties Union, reluctance to resort to the federal courts during the post-
Lochner era); REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 69–71 (2006) (discussing the progressive’s 
campaign to limit federal jurisdiction). 
 10. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 11. See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C. 
 12. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986). 
 13. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980). 
 14. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996). 
 15. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren Court (And Why It 
Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L. J. 255, 274–87 (2008). 
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separation of powers to limit access to courts for civil rights litigants,16 and 
adopted substantive doctrines that made it harder for those litigants to 
prevail on their claims.17 Today, the Roberts Court, rather than invoking 
judicial supremacy to protect civil rights against infringement by the 
majority, has invoked it to restrict the ability of the political branches to do 
so.18 What remains of the Cooper legacy is pure judicial supremacy without 
its counter-majoritarian justification. Regardless of the Court’s good 
intentions in Cooper, Cooper supremacy is a cautionary example of the 
dangers of one branch of government assuming too much power. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITY RIGHTS 
Prior to the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education,19 the Supreme 
Court of the United States provided little protection for racial minorities. In 
its early cases interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court largely 
rejected the claims of freed slaves and their descendants to protection under 
that Amendment.20 For example, in the 1896 case of Plessy v. Ferguson,21 
the Court upheld a Louisiana law which required railroad cars to be 
segregated on the basis of race.22 The Court held that state laws that required 
“separate but equal” accommodations for people of different races did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 A few 
years later, the Court upheld a Kentucky state law which prohibited 
universities from providing desegregated education to blacks and whites.24 
Clearly, the federal courts provided scant recourse for African Americans 
seeking racial justice. 
During the early twentieth century, progressives advocated for the 
doctrine of judicial deference and decried judicial activism, which they 
 
 16. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 17. See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 18. See infra Section IV.C. 
 19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 20. The Court struck down a West Virginia law excluding blacks from jury service in 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). However, the Court rejected the civil rights 
claims of blacks who had been injured in the Colfax massacre, a race riot in Louisiana, 
holding that congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend to 
addressing private action in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The Court 
reaffirmed its state action doctrine in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) striking down 
the 1875 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited race discrimination in privately owned places of 
public accommodation, as beyond Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 22. Id. at 552. 
 23. Id. at 548. 
 24. Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). 
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viewed as protecting the powerful against the powerless.25 Progressives 
accused the Court of judicial activism and attacked the institution of judicial 
review. They argued that it was inappropriate for unelected federal courts to 
strike down measures enacted by democratically elected legislatures.26 Some 
progressives called for the abolition of judicial review.27 Others supported 
measures to curtail the Court’s power and introduced numerous bills in 
Congress which would have limited federal jurisdiction.28 In 1932, 
progressive allies of labor succeeded with the passage of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, which prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions in 
labor disputes.29 However, other activists sought to use the courts to enforce 
individual rights. The National Association of Colored People (NAACP) 
formed in 1909 and began a legal campaign to overturn Plessy v. 
Ferguson.30 A change in the Court’s approach to rights during the New Deal 
Era opened the door for their success. 
A. The Right to Contract and the Progressive Campaign Against Judicial 
Activism 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the only individual right that 
the Supreme Court of the United States enforced was the “right to contract” 
of workers and employers. For example, in Lochner v. New York,31 the Court 
struck down a state law limiting the working hours of bakers as violating 
their right to contract to work more hours.32 In Coppage v. Kansas,33 the 
Court struck down a law prohibiting employers from forcing their 
employees to pledge not to join unions as a condition of employment.34 In 
Hammer v. Dagenhart,35 the Court struck down a federal law limiting the 
use of child labor on federalism grounds.36 These rulings sparked the 
 
 25. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR 
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937, at 13–14 (1994). 
 26. Id. at 131. For example, progressives supported the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which 
prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor-management disputes and 
established a process of expedited review of federal court decisions striking down state laws 
as unconstitutional. See ZIETLOW, supra note 9, at 71. 
 27. ROSS, supra note 25, at 49–56. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2018); see Zietlow, supra note 15, at 
71. 
 30. See MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 1 (1987). 
 31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 32. Id. at 64–65. 
 33. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
 34. Id. at 26. 
 35. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 36. Id. at 277. 
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progressive attacks on the federal courts.37 During the New Deal Era, the 
Court further angered progressives, including President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, by striking down popular measures regulating the economy.38 By 
1936, Lochner and its progeny were widely viewed as an inappropriate use 
of judicial power, examples of harmful judicial activism intruding upon 
progressive reform legislation.39 After he was re-elected in a landslide that 
year, President Roosevelt proposed a plan to expand the Court’s 
membership so that he could appoint judges who were sympathetic to his 
New Deal measure.40 Although Roosevelt’s court-packing plan failed,41 the 
Court began to back away from its activist approach to economic 
legislation.42 
In the late 1930s, the Court abandoned its “right to contract” 
jurisprudence. In the 1936 case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,43 the 
Court upheld a Washington law establishing a minimum wage over the 
objections that it violated the right to contract.44 In the 1937 case of NLRB v. 
Jones,45 the Court did not even mention the right to contract when it upheld 
the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, a progressive New 
Deal measure which established a federal right to organize into unions and 
bargain collectively.46 In the 1938 case of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.,47 the Court abandoned its right to contract jurisprudence and 
declared a new approach of deference to economic legislation.48 In 
subsequent cases, the Court made it clear that it would no longer intervene 
in the legislative process to protect the “right to contract.”49 The Court’s turn 
 
 37. ROSS, supra note 25, at 167. 
 38. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) 
(striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act as an invalid use of Congress’s 
commerce powers); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down 
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, which regulated the hours and wages of coal miners, 
as an invalid use of Congress’s commerce powers). 
 39. See ZIETLOW, supra note 9, at 84; see also RISA GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF 
CIVIL RIGHTS 34 (2007). 
 40. KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY 
PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 61 (2004). 
 41. Id. at 83. 
 42. Id. at 86. 
 43. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 44. Id. at 400. 
 45. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 46. Id. at 49. 
 47. 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding a federal law barring the sale of “filled milk”). 
 48. Id. at 153–54. 
 49. See W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage legislation 
for women and casting doubt on the existence of a right to contract). West Coast Hotel Co. 
overruled an earlier precedent, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), in which 
the Court struck down minimum wage legislation as violating the right to contract. 300 U.S. 
379. 
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away from the right to contract and its embrace of judicial deference left 
open the question of when, if ever, the Court would intervene in the political 
process to protect individual rights.50 In a footnote to his majority opinion in 
Carolene Products, Justice Harlan F. Stone suggested a new approach to 
rights, one in which courts would intervene to protect the rights of 
minorities.51 
B. Carolene Products and Judicial Protection of “Discrete and Insular 
Minorities” 
In Carolene Products, the Court rejected a challenge to a federal law 
which prohibited the sale of “filled milk.”52 The challengers argued that the 
law violated their right to contract, but the Court disagreed.53 In his majority 
opinion, Justice Stone expressed great deference to Congress and indicated a 
reluctance to overturn democratically enacted legislation.54 However, Stone 
admitted that sometimes the Court’s deference to the political process might 
not be warranted. In footnote four, Stone suggested that legislation that 
harms “discrete insular minorities,” or that infringes on expressly 
enumerated constitutional rights, indicates that the political process is not 
working and would not be entitled to the same presumption of 
constitutionality that the Court extends to legislation in general.55 
The Carolene Products rule of deference reflected the presumption that 
the political process usually worked.56 Moreover, courts should defer to 
legislatures because they are elected by the people and therefore accountable 
to the people in a way that judges are not.57 The Court’s overall approach to 
evaluating legislation assumed that the political process generally 
functioned well. However, footnote four suggested that legislation 
restricting the political process might be subject to “more exacting” judicial 
scrutiny.58 Footnote four also acknowledged the fact that prejudice against 
“discrete and insular minorities” tends to “curtail the operation of those 
political processes” and thus may also be subject to a more searching 
inquiry.59 Stone’s footnote thus laid out a persuasive justification for the 
Court to act to protect minority rights. 
 
 50. See GOLUBOFF, supra note 39, at 16. 
 51. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 52. Id. at 148. 
 53. Id. at 147. 
 54. Id. at 153. 
 55. Id. at 152 n.4. 
 56. See ELY, supra note 13, at 86. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 59. Id. 
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In the late 1930s, African Americans were the textbook example of 
“discrete and insular minorities” that the political process had failed 
repeatedly. In the North, blacks were a minority of voters, and their political 
clout was limited by racial discrimination.60 In the South, blacks were 
excluded from voting.61 Despite the fact that the Fifteenth Amendment 
expressly prohibits states from denying the franchise on the basis of race, 
blacks faced violence, even death, if they even attempted to exercise their 
political rights.62 Jim Crow laws and brutal violence in the South, coupled 
with the lack of protections from race discrimination in the North, evidenced 
that blacks were truly “discrete and insular minorities”63 who needed 
protection from the tyranny of the majority. In subsequent years, members 
of the Court cautiously embraced its role of enforcing constitutional rights 
and protecting the rights of minorities. 
In a 1943 case striking down a law that required children who were 
Jehovah’s Witnesses to recite the pledge of allegiance in school, Justice 
Robert Jackson opined, “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to 
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them 
as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”64 The Court began to protect 
the voting rights of African Americans in a series of cases invalidating 
racially restrictive election practices.65 In the 1948 case of Shelley v. 
Kramer,66 the Court held that a racially restrictive covenant violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.67 With these 
opinions, the Court signaled its willingness to tackle race discrimination. 
The most significant of the Court’s early rulings protecting the rights of 
minorities was the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education.68 In 
Brown, the Court held that state mandated segregation of public education 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69 Brown 
was the culmination of a decades-long strategy by the NAACP Legal 
 
 60. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 291 (2004). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 374. 
 63. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 64. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 65. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that a racially exclusionary 
primaries held by a private organization that functioned as the Democratic Party violated the 
Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that racially 
exclusionary primaries violated the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 66. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 67. Id. at 13–14. 
 68. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 69. Id. at 495. 
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Defense Fund to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.70 In a series of per curiam 
rulings following Brown, the Court established that Brown had overruled 
Plessy and held that all state mandated segregation violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.71 
In Shelley, Brown, and cases following Brown, the Court intruded on 
the political process and overturned laws supported by the majority. Though 
progressives had condemned the Court’s activism during the Lochner era, 
many applauded the Court’s ruling in Brown.72 Supporters of civil rights 
agreed that protecting discrete and insular minorities justified Court rulings 
upholding the civil rights of blacks.73 Fixing the political process justified 
the Court’s intervention in the political process in the South, where blacks 
had historically been denied the right to vote.74 Repeat losers in the political 
process, African Americans needed the Court to intervene on their behalf 
and correct that imbalance. Over time, many scholars came to view the 
Justices on the Warren Court as counter-majoritarian heroes in the fight for 
civil rights.75 The Court asserted that role most strongly in Cooper v. 
Aaron.76 
 
 70. The NAACP had scored incremental victories, laying the groundwork for Brown, in 
a series of cases challenging racially segregated law schools. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 
U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that a separate law school for blacks established by the University 
of Texas violated the Equal Protection Clause); Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 
337 (1938) (holding as unconstitutional a Missouri law that excluded blacks from its state 
law school). 
 71. See Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (invalidating segregation of courtroom 
seating); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (public restaurants); Gayle v. 
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (municipal bus system); Balt. City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 
(1955) (public beaches and bathhouses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) 
(public golf courses). 
 72. Klarman, supra note 14, at 19. 
 73. Id. at 1 (“It is common wisdom that a fundamental purpose of judicial review is to 
protect minority rights from majoritarian over-reaching.”). 
 74. ELY, supra note 13, at 116. 
 75. A recent Lexis search uncovered 506 law review articles written in the past twenty 
years advocating the proposition that courts should protect minorities against the will of the 
majority. For just a few of the many prominent scholars supporting this view, see JUDITH 
BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 281 (1983); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW 
BIRTH OF FREEDOM 125 (1997); ELY, supra note 13, at 7; KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO 
AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1989); see also JOHN J. DINAN, 
KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF 
RIGHTS, at x (1998) (stating that “the nation’s leading law faculty are nearly unanimous” in 
believing the judiciary is best suited to protecting liberties). But see Frank B. Cross, 
Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529 (2000) 
(questioning this assumption). 
 76. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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III. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND COOPER V. AARON 
In Cooper, the Court addressed a direct conflict between state 
majorities and the rights of minorities over essential constitutional 
valuesthe equal protection of the law.77 The Court’s opinion was signed 
by all of the members of the Court, a highly unusual, if not unprecedented, 
step.78 The Court’s opinion in Cooper asserted its absolute commitment to 
protecting the civil rights of African Americans and proclaimed its 
legitimacy when doing so.79 
A. Historical Background 
The facts underlying Cooper began in Little Rock, Arkansas, shortly 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.80 The state of Arkansas, like 
other Southern states, had required the segregation of public schools.81 
Responding to Brown, members of the Little Rock School Board met and 
formulated a plan to desegregate the public schools.82 Under the plan of 
gradual desegregation adopted by the school board, the process would begin 
in the fall of 1957 and be completed by the fall of 1963.83 Desegregation 
would begin in the high school and eventually extend to Little Rock’s 
elementary schools.84 A group of black school children and their parents 
filed a lawsuit challenging the plan and asking for faster action.85 However, 
the district court approved the plan,86 and the court of appeals affirmed.87 
While the local school board was incalcitrant, Arkansas state officials 
went much further in their resistance to the Brown ruling. In November 
1956, the Arkansas constitution was amended, “commanding the Arkansas 
General Assembly to oppose ‘in every Constitutional manner the Un-
constitutional desegregation decisions of [Brown and Brown II].’”88 In 
February of 1957, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted a law relieving 
school children from compulsory attendance at racially mixed schools89 and 
 
 77. Id. at 16–19. 
 78. Id. at 4. 
 79. Id. 16–19. 
 80. Id. at 4. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7. 
 83. Id. at 8. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956). 
 87. Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1957). 
 88. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 8–9 (quoting ARK. CONST. amend. XLIV (repealed 1990)). 
 89. Id. at 9 (citing ARK. STATS. §§ 80-1519 to 80-1524 (1957)). 
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adopted a measure establishing a “State Sovereignty Commission.”90 These 
laws defied the Brown decision and created a direct conflict between state 
and federal law. The conflict exploded on the ground in Little Rock.91 
On September 2, 1957, the day before nine black students were 
scheduled to attend their first day at Little Rock Central High, Arkansas 
Governor Orval Faubus dispatched the Arkansas state militia to the school 
grounds and block the black students’ access to the school.92 The governor’s 
actions sparked increased opposition to the desegregation plan by Little 
Rock residents.93 The school board asked the district court to postpone the 
desegregation plan, citing the stationing of military guard by state 
authorities.94 However, the district court rejected the board’s petition and 
ordered it to proceed.95 For three weeks, the Arkansas National Guard 
prevented the schoolchildren from entering the school.96 The district court 
issued an injunction prohibiting the governor and the National Guard from 
preventing the attendance of the black children at Central High School, but 
the federal judge could not implement his decision without help from the 
United States military.97 
On September 25, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower dispatched 
federal troops to Central High to protect the black students against the angry 
mobs which surrounded the school and to effectuate the federal judge’s 
order.98 Federal troops stayed in Little Rock until November 27, escorting 
the students to and from school and protecting them while they attended 
school.99 On February 20, 1958, the school board petitioned the district court 
again, asking the judge to postpone their desegregation program due to the 
extreme hostility against the black students.100 School board officials sought 
to withdraw the students from Central High and send them to their former 
segregated school.101 This time, the judge granted the petition due to the 
conditions of “chaos, bedlam and turmoil.”102 The court of appeals reversed 
the district court, and the school board appealed that ruling to the Supreme 
Court of the United States.103 
 
 90. Id. (citing ARK. STATS. §§ 6-801 to 6-824 (1957)). 
 91. KLARMAN, supra note 60, at 326–27. 
 92. Id. at 326. 
 93. Id. at 327; see Cooper, 358 U.S. at 9–10. 
 94. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 10. 
 95. Id. at 11. 
 96. Id. 
 97. KLARMAN, supra note 60, at 326–27. 
 98. Id. at 326. 
 99. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 12. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 12–13. 
 102. Id. at 13. 
 103. Id. at 14. 
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B. Supreme Court Proceedings 
Cooper arrived at the Supreme Court of the United States at the end of 
the summer of 1958.104 As school was scheduled to begin in Little Rock on 
September 15, the Court placed the case on a fast-track docket and issued its 
preliminary ruling immediately after the hearing.105 The case presented a 
dramatic challenge to the Court’s legitimacy and to the legitimacy of lower 
federal courts tasked with enforcing the Court’s Brown ruling.106 Moreover, 
the case involved not only a direct conflict between state and federal law, 
but a conflict that state officials had instigated by directly defying the 
Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution.107 President 
Eisenhower had backed the Court by sending federal troops to Arkansas, but 
even after that assertion of federal power, state officials remained defiant.108 
In this context, the Court’s signed per curiam decision dramatically asserted 
its authority to interpret the Constitution and to protect minority rights.109 
According to the Court, the case “raise[d] questions of the highest 
importance to the maintenance of our federal system of government,” 
including most notably whether state officials were bound by the rulings of 
the Supreme Court of the United States.110 The answer, said the Court, was 
in the United States Constitution itself, which declares the Constitution the 
“supreme law of the land” and requires elected state officials to swear an 
oath to uphold it.111 Quoting Marbury v. Madison,112 the Court asserted, “[i]t 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.”113 Thus identifying itself with the Constitution, the Court held 
that the logical consequence was that state officials had to adhere to its 
rulings. Said the Court, “the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land,” 
is binding on state officials as the written Constitution itself.114 
In Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall had been more circumspect, 
concluding that “a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, 
as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”115 Marshall thus 
left open the possibility that other government officials might share the 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 14. 
 106. Id. at 4. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
 112. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 113. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180. 
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responsibility to interpret constitutional meaning.116 However, in Cooper, 
the Court resolved any ambiguity. When opinions differed, the Court’s 
opinion was supreme, trumping all other government officials.117 The 
Court’s assertion of absolute authority made sense in the face of open 
defiance by state officials. Moreover, the Court asserted its power in defense 
of the rights of those who needed protection from those officials.118 Cooper 
was an assertion of raw power nonetheless. 
In the Cooper decision, the Court explained that state officials had to 
follow the Court’s ruling in Brown, even though they had not been parties to 
the case, because “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the 
law of the Constitution.”119 State officials are bound to follow the United 
States Constitution, and the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution had 
the same authority as the Constitution itself.120 It follows that “the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the 
Brown case is the supreme law of the land.”121 The Court concluded, 
[T]he principles announced in [Brown v. Board of Education] and the 
obedience of the States to them, according to the command of the 
Constitution, are indispensable for the protection of the freedoms 
guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us. Our constitutional 
ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth.
122
 
In this unanimous per curiam opinion, signed by all of the Justices on 
the Court, those Justices embraced their roles as “counter-majoritarian 
heroes”123 and champions of racial justice.124 
IV. EVOLUTION OF COOPER SUPREMACY 
In Cooper, the Supreme Court expressed two important themes. First, 
the Court claimed a unique relationship with the United States Constitution. 
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All federal and state officials are required to swear an oath to the 
Constitution and must engage in constitutional interpretation as part of their 
official duties.125 However, in Cooper, the Court made it clear that of all of 
those officials, the Supreme Court of the United States is the supreme 
interpreter of the Constitution, and its interpretations trump those of all other 
officials.126 Second, the Court made it clear that it would use that position to 
protect individual constitutional rights, especially the rights of those who 
were vulnerable to the oppression of the majoritarian, elected, political 
branches.127 Thus, the Court not only reaffirmed its ruling in Brown but 
reaffirmed the federal judiciary’s commitment to protecting minority rights. 
After an initial expansion of the Court’s protection of minority rights 
post-Cooper, the Court began to retreat from civil rights enforcement and 
place new procedural limits upon civil rights cases. More recently, the Court 
has adhered only to the first theme of Cooper supremacy—the Court’s 
special role interpreting the Constitution, and its supremacy over the states 
and coordinate branches when doing so.128 The Court has largely abandoned 
the second prong of Cooper supremacy, the Court’s rights protecting role.129 
Instead, the Court has restricted the ability of federal courts and Congress to 
protect civil rights.130 
A. Expansion and Deference: The Warren Court (1953–1969) 
Following Cooper, the Warren Court issued many rulings expanding 
the meaning of minority rights under the Equal Protection Clause. For 
example, the Court struck down state laws which discriminated on the basis 
of race,131 and broadly interpreted voting rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment.132 Perhaps the most important Warren 
Court rulings were those which opened up the lower federal courts to civil 
rights lawsuits and enabled those courts to remedy rights violations by state 
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officials.133 In addition, and despite its assertion of supreme constitutional 
authority in Cooper, the Warren Court generally deferred to the other 
federal branches when they also acted to protect minority rights.134 This 
deference was undoubtedly due to the fact that federal officials in the 1960s 
agreed with the Court’s mission of protecting minority rights against state 
infringement.135 Thus, even as the Warren Court relied on Cooper to strike 
down state laws discriminating against minorities, it deferred to the 
coordinate federal branches as they also sought to advance the cause of civil 
rights. 
1. Opening Courts to Civil Rights Claims 
The most notable Warren Court decision expanding civil rights 
litigation was its 1961 ruling in Monroe v. Pape.136 In Monroe, the plaintiff 
sued police officers in the city of Chicago, arguing that the officers had 
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when they searched him 
and his apartment without probable cause.137 The lawsuit was brought 
pursuant to the Reconstruction Era civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
which provides a cause of action to enforce constitutional rights against 
officials acting under color of state law.138 Though enacted in 1871, the 
statute had largely lain dormant until the Court’s opinion in Monroe.139 At 
issue was the question of whether police officers who violated state law 
were acting under color of law and thus subject to suit under § 1983.140 The 
police officers argued for a narrower interpretation of the statutethat it 
would only apply to state officials following state law.141 The Court adopted 
the broader interpretationa state official was acting under state law, thus 
subject to suit under § 1983, whenever he was on duty.142 
The Court’s ruling in Monroe had a revolutionary impact on civil rights 
litigation. Before Monroe, state officials throughout the country had violated 
the federal rights of individuals without much fear of being sued.143 The 
Court’s expansive interpretation of § 1983 opened up the federal courts for 
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broad enforcement of federal rights.144 The Warren Court also overturned 
previous court rulings and held that almost the entire Bill of Rights was 
incorporated, and thus enforceable, against state governments.145 
In other cases, the Warren Court articulated a broad test for courts to 
imply private rights of action to enforce federal statutes. The issue arises 
when Congress creates federal rights without clarifying how they are to be 
enforced, and the executive branch promulgates federal regulations 
enforcing those statutes. In J. I. Case v. Borak,146 the Court held that 
individual plaintiffs could sue to enforce federal statutes whenever such a 
suit was necessary to make effective a congressional purpose.147 This wide-
open test allowed the Court to use its discretion in determining 
congressional purpose, making it relatively easy for individual plaintiffs to 
sue to enforce statutes when Congress had not made it clear that it intended 
plaintiffs to do so.148 
In another series of cases, the Warren Court narrowly interpreted 
justiciability doctrines, such as standing and political question doctrines, 
which could otherwise have served as barriers to civil rights litigation. For 
example, in Flast v. Cohen,149 the Court held that taxpayers had standing to 
argue that congressional authorization of the payment of federal funds to 
religious schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.150 The Flast opinion created an exception to the longstanding 
rule that taxpayers could not sue the government for violating the 
Constitution by spending their money.151 Similarly, in Baker v. Carr,152 the 
Court allowed a challenge to voting districts under the Equal Protection 
Clause, finding that it was not barred by the long-standing rule that similar 
reapportionment cases based on the Article IV Guaranty Clause were non-
justiciable political questions.153 Baker set the stage for the Court’s ruling in 
Reynolds v. Sims,154 where the Court ruled that districts for United States 
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and state representatives must be apportioned equally.155 In Reynolds, the 
Court intervened directly in the Alabama state political process, fully 
embracing its mission to make the process fairer and more just for 
minorities, as well as other voters.156 Thus, the Warren Court’s flexibility on 
justiciability issues furthered its mission to protect minority rights. 
In the private right of action and justiciability cases, the Court made it 
clear that separation-of-powers limitations would not prevent it from 
enforcing individual rights. Thus, many Warren Court rulings following 
Cooper reinforced Cooper’s message that the federal courts were open for 
business in enforcing civil rights. The Warren Court actively embraced the 
first prong of Cooper supremacythe Court’s commitment to protecting 
minority rights. 
2. Deference to Other Federal Branches 
However, the Warren Court was circumspect about its other Cooper 
messagethat of judicial supremacy. Despite the Warren Court’s activist 
reputation, the Court set a highly deferential baseline evaluating economic 
legislation which did not infringe on minority rights.157 Moreover, the 
Warren Court used its Cooper supremacy largely to strike down state laws 
that discriminated against minorities but shied away from striking down 
federal legislation.158 The Court was especially deferential to Congress and 
the executive branch when those federal branches acted to protect minority 
rights.159 Even when Congress arguably entered the Court’s realm of 
constitutional interpretation, the Court applied a deferential rational basis 
review and upheld that legislation.160 
Responding to civil rights activists, the 1960s Congress enacted 
numerous measures defining and protecting equality rights. For example, 
Congress outlawed race discrimination by privately owned places of public 
accommodation with the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.161 Prior to 
the Act, members of the Court disagreed about whether it was a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause when private businesses called on the police to 
arrest blacks for trespass, enforcing private segregation.162 In 1883, the 
Court ruled that Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment 
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did not reach private discrimination,163 and some members of the Court were 
reluctant to overturn that precedent.164 Congress sidestepped that issue by 
relying on the Commerce Clause as well as the Equal Protection Clause as 
sources of its power to outlaw private race discrimination.165 In Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,166 the Court upheld the Act as a valid 
Commerce Clause measure.167 The Court applied a deferential rational basis 
review to uphold the statute protecting minority rights.168 The Court’s 
majority opinion sidestepped the Equal Protection issue and addressed only 
the Commerce Clause question, thereby avoiding a potentially awkward 
confrontation with Congress over constitutional meaning.169 
The Court was even more deferential to Congress in evaluating the 
constitutionality of another landmark civil rights measure, the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (VRA).170 The VRA outlawed the states’ use of discriminatory 
barriers to voting, including literacy tests.171 Many Southern states had 
required voters to take a literacy test as a condition of voting and 
discriminated against blacks when administering those tests.172 In the 1959 
case of Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections,173 the Court 
had held that literacy tests did not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless 
plaintiffs could prove that state officials intentionally discriminated when 
administering the tests.174 However, with Section 4(b) of the 1965 Act, 
Congress prohibited the use of literacy tests in all congressional districts 
which had a disproportionately low level of minority voters.175 
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Notwithstanding the Court’s ruling in Lassiter, Section 4(b) did not require 
plaintiffs to prove that local officials had intentionally discriminated against 
minority voters.176 Congress expressly relied on its power to enforce the 
Fifteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause when enacting the VRA.177 Thus, the Court was forced to confront 
the issue of whether Congress could interpret the Amendment more 
expansively than the Court did. 
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,178 the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of Section 4(b).179 South Carolina argued that the law 
intruded on the Court’s power to interpret the Constitution because it 
prohibited practices that no court had found to be unconstitutional.180 In his 
majority opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren rejected the argument that only 
the Court could determine the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.181 To 
the contrary, the framers of the Amendment had intended Congress to be 
“chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in Section One.”182 
Citing McCulloch v. Maryland,183 the Court held that the only role for the 
Court was to determine whether the legislation was a rational means to 
effectuate the Equal Protection Clause.184 The Court deferred to 
congressional findings that literacy tests had in all likelihood been used with 
a discriminatory purpose in the states most affected by the statute and held 
that Section 4(b) was a rational means to address state officials’ 
discriminatory use of literacy tests.185 
Katzenbach was a relatively easy case because it involved the type of 
discrimination which Congress had found to be widespread in Southern 
states.186 Even in Lassiter, the Court agreed that if such discrimination 
existed, it would violate the Equal Protection Clause.187 Arguably, Congress 
had not usurped the Court’s role of articulating constitutional meaning, but 
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only augmented it. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,188 however, the Court 
evaluated a measure which went well beyond any court rulings.189 At issue 
in Morgan was Section 4(e) of the VRA, which provided that no person who 
has successfully completed the sixth grade in a public school accredited by 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was 
other than English could be denied the right to vote on account of his or her 
failure to read English.190 Section 4(e) remedied discrimination which had 
never been identified by any court, because no court had ever held that New 
York state officials had used the literacy tests to discriminate on the basis of 
race.191 Hence, the case directly raised the question of whether Congress had 
the autonomous authority to identify violations of the Equal Protection 
Clause, arguably challenging the Court’s role to do so.192 
In his majority opinion, Justice William Brennan rejected the state’s 
argument that the statute exceeded Congress’s power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment under Section Five of that Amendment. The Court 
stated, “[a] construction of Section Five that would require a judicial 
determination that the enforcement of a state law precluded by Congress 
violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional 
enactment, would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and 
congressional responsibility for implementing the amendment.”193 As in 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court cited McCulloch, holding that 
Section Five was intended to give Congress the “same broad powers 
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”194 The Court’s only role was 
to determine whether Congress was rational when it identified 
discrimination and enacted a law to remedy that discrimination. “It is not for 
us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that 
we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve this 
conflict as it did.”195 Thus, in Morgan, the Court appeared to defer to 
congressional judgment about the meaning of the Constitution. 
The other branches of the federal government responded to the Court 
with mutual support. In the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Congress included 
provisions prohibiting recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the 
basis of race and empowering the Attorney General to bring suits to enforce 
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the Act.196 In a speech in support of the Civil Rights Act, Senator Hubert 
Humphrey explained that Congress intended those measures to enable 
further enforcement of the Brown ruling.197 Thus, both federal branches 
acted with respectful deference to advance the cause of civil rights and 
avoided potentially awkward conflicts over the scope of each branch’s 
authority. 
During the Warren Court years, Presidents John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon B. Johnson largely supported the Court’s effort to enforce minority 
rights. Though initially reluctant, like President Eisenhower, President 
Kennedy sent federal troops to guard black students attempting to attend 
public universities in Mississippi and Alabama over state and local 
resistance.198 President Johnson helped to lead the successful fight for the 
1964 Civil Rights and 1965 Voting Rights Acts,199 and after they were 
enacted his administration actively enforced their provisions.200 
Nonetheless, liberals viewed the federal courts as “counter-majoritarian 
heroes” and celebrated the judicial supremacy of Cooper as a necessary 
means to a crucially important end.201 This viewpoint was bolstered by state 
officials’ continued resistance to federal court oversight, from Alabama 
Governor George Wallace’s declaration of “segregation now, segregation 
tomorrow, segregation forever” on the steps of the state capitol to state 
courts adoption of novel interpretations of state procedural laws to evade 
Supreme Court review of their interpretations of federal law.202 I was taught 
this model when I was a student at Yale Law School in the late 1980s. Many 
of my professors reminisced about where they were and what they were 
doing, when the Court decided Brown. It is only a slight exaggeration to say 
that my professors viewed the Justices in Cooper as white knights fending 
off the unruly racist mobs who would resist federal courts’ civil rights 
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enforcement. Many scholars have expressed similar views.203 Thus, liberals 
lauded both prongs of the Cooper rulingjudicial supremacy and support 
for minority rightsas essential to the expansion of civil rights. 
B. Reaction and Retrenchment: The Burger (1969–1986) and Rehnquist 
(1986–2005) Courts 
Though liberals lauded the Warren Court, conservatives harshly 
criticized the Court and accused it of judicial activism.204 In 1968, Richard 
Nixon ran for president with a “tough on crime” platform and attacked the 
Warren Court’s rulings that enforced the rights of criminal defendants.205 
Chief Justice Warren resigned in 1968, and when Nixon was elected, he 
appointed conservative Warren E. Burger to replace him.206 President Nixon 
also made another key appointment to the Supreme CourtJustice William 
Rehnquist.207 Under Chief Justice Burger, and due largely to Rehnquist’s 
influence, the Court backed away from the active civil rights enforcement of 
the Warren Court.208 The Burger Court continued to use Cooper supremacy 
over the other federal branches, but no longer to protect minority rights.209 
Warren Burger retired as Chief Justice in 1986.210 To replace him, 
President Ronald Reagan elevated the chief architect of the Court’s 
retrenchment on civil rights, Justice Rehnquist, to be Chief Justice.211 
Reagan then appointed an outspoken conservative, Antonin Scalia, to take 
Rehnquist’s place as Associate Justice.212 Under Rehnquist’s leadership, and 
with Scalia as the most outspoken champion, the Court engaged in a full-
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scale retrenchment from the role of protector of the rights of minorities.213 
The Rehnquist Court revitalized principles of state sovereignty that the 
Warren Court had downplayed.214 The Rehnquist Court also adopted a race 
blind approach to race discrimination cases and struck down race-based 
affirmative action measures.215 Ironically, in the Court’s affirmative action 
cases, the Court has imposed barriers to majoritarian political branches 
adopting remedial measures to advance minority rights.216 
1. Retreating from Civil Rights Enforcement 
The Burger Court had a mixed record on civil rights. In its 
desegregation decisions, the Burger Court authorized the supervision of 
local school boards by district courts and approved bussing and other 
affirmative measures to remedy race discrimination in public schools.217 The 
Burger Court also ruled in favor of plaintiffs in a series of cases asserting 
sex equality rights under the Equal Protection Clause.218 In addition, the 
third Nixon appointee, Justice Harry Blackmun, wrote the opinion in Roe v. 
Wade,219 establishing a constitutional right for a woman to choose to have an 
abortion.220 All of these cases were consistent with the Warren Court’s 
rulings protecting minority rights. 
On the other hand, the Burger Court also began a retrenchment in civil 
rights cases. In Milliken v. Bradley,221 the Court struck down a Michigan 
district court’s order mandating a multi-district remedy for the segregation 
of public schools in Detroit, Michigan.222 The Court’s ruling in Milliken 
greatly limited the power of federal courts to remedy segregation in the face 
of white flight to the suburbs.223 Lower federal courts continued to exercise 
oversight over local school districts and to implement desegregation plans 
through the 1980s, but the Rehnquist Court restricted the scope of the 
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courts’ remedial power. In the 1991 case of Board of Education v. Dowell,224 
the Rehnquist Court ruled that district courts could cease supervision of 
local school districts once they had achieved a “unitary” status of non-
segregation.225 In the 1995 case of Missouri v. Jenkins,226 the Court clarified 
that once a local school district had complied with a court’s desegregation 
order, the district court was required to dismiss the case.227 These rulings 
ended the federal courts’ decades-long attempts to enforce Brown, 
decimating the civil rights legacy of Cooper.228 
In addition, the Court issued key rulings making it more difficult for 
minority plaintiffs to win race discrimination cases. In Washington v. 
Davis,229 the Burger Court held that in order for plaintiffs to bring a cause of 
action for race discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, they had to 
prove that the state had purposely discriminated against them on the basis of 
race.230 The Davis ruling makes it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prevail 
in race discrimination cases, especially in Northern states lacking a record of 
de jure discrimination.231 In McCleskey v. Kemp,232 a challenge to the State 
of Georgia’s use of the death penalty, the Court held that statistical evidence 
alone is insufficient to prove that the government discriminated on the basis 
of race.233 The Court ruled against McCleskey even though it acknowledged 
the history of race discrimination within the Georgia criminal justice 
system.234 In order to prevail, McCleskey needed to show that government 
officials had intentionally discriminated against him as an individual, or that 
the state had adopted the death penalty because of, not merely in spite of, 
the racially discriminatory impact of the death penalty system.235 The 
Court’s ruling in Davis and McCleskey signaled a significant retrenchment 
from the Court’s commitment to minority rights. 
In another series of rulings, the Court struck down measures intended 
to benefit minorities. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,236 
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the Court held that a white man could bring a race discrimination challenge 
to the university’s affirmative action plan.237 In cases following Bakke, the 
Court debated whether to apply a lower level of scrutiny to affirmative 
action measures intended to benefit minorities than the strict scrutiny that it 
applies to laws discriminating against minorities.238 In Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,239 the Court held that strict scrutiny would apply 
to all race-based classifications.240 In his concurrence to Adarand, Justice 
Clarence Thomas argued that all race-based classifications violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, regardless of how well-intentioned they might be. Said 
Justice Thomas, “In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination 
based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by 
malicious prejudice.”241 Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens ridiculed the 
Court’s equivalency, accusing the Court of disregarding the difference 
between a “No Trespassing Sign” and a welcome mat.242 Reflecting the 
continuing division on the Court, the Court issued divided rulings on the 
University of Michigan’s two affirmative action programs, upholding the 
law school program but striking down the undergraduate admissions 
program.243 Disputes over race-based affirmative action programs continued 
into the Roberts Court.244 While the Court’s rulings on discriminatory intent 
make it difficult for minority plaintiffs to win civil rights cases, the Court’s 
rulings on affirmative action programs, however, have turned the Court’s 
commitment to minority rights on its head. 
 
 237. Id. at 299. 
 238. See, e.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny 
and upholding an FCC policy that gave a preference to minority-owned businesses in 
broadcast licensing). But see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (containing a 
divided opinion with a three-Justice concurrence applying intermediate scrutiny, upholding a 
federal contracting program in which ten percent of contracts were reserved for minority 
businesses); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict 
scrutiny to strike down a local minority set-aside program which was virtually identical to 
federal program upheld in Fullilove). 
 239. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 240. Id. at 226; see also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (holding that strict 
scrutiny should apply to race-based assignment of prisoners, notwithstanding the Court’s 
long-held deference to decisions of prison officials). 
 241. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 242. Id. at 245. 
 243. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down the undergraduate 
admissions program because race was a decisive factor in the decision-making process); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the law school admissions program 
because race was not the decisive factor). 
 244. See infra Section IV.C.1. 
2019] COOPER SUPREMACY 309 
2. Procedural Limits on Civil Rights Litigation 
At the same time that the Court has retreated from its commitment to 
the substantive rights of minorities, it has also imposed numerous procedural 
barriers to civil rights plaintiffs. The Warren Court had thrown the door 
open to the federal courts, welcoming challenges to discriminatory state 
action. Since then, the Court has slowly closed the door, with rulings 
limiting private rights of action, enforcing justiciability limits and sovereign 
immunity, and adopting standards for official immunity which make it 
virtually impossible for civil rights plaintiffs to prevail. 
As with the substantive cases, the Burger Court had a mixed record on 
procedural issues. In the notable case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,245 the Court found an implied 
private right of action to enforce the Fourth Amendment against federal 
officials.246 The Court had identified a similar right of action in 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 against state officials in Monroe v. Pape.247 However, § 1983 does not 
extend to federal officials.248 Nevertheless, in an opinion written by Justice 
William Brennan, the Court held that federal courts had inherent power to 
enforce constitutional rights.249 Although Justice Brennan identified some 
exceptional circumstances in which the federal courts would lack such 
power,250 his Bivens opinion articulated a blanket rule generally authorizing 
suits against federal officials.251 
The Court applied the Bivens rule to authorize sex discrimination cases 
under the Equal Protection Clause against members of Congress252 and to 
enforce the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.253 However, the Court soon backed away from Bivens, finding 
other causes of action to fall within the exceptions identified by Justice 
Brennan in Bivens,254 claims involving sensitive contexts and those in which 
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Congress has authorized a different remedy.255 In Schweiker v. Chilicky, the 
Court established a presumption against a Bivens remedy whenever 
Congress has enacted legislation creating any kind of remedy.256 The 
Schweiker presumption effectively precludes the Court from identifying any 
new cause of action to enforce constitutional rights against federal officials, 
undermining Bivens. 
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts also restricted private rights of action 
to enforce federal statutes. In Cort v. Ash,257 the Court articulated a four-part 
test to determine whether Congress intended to authorize a private right of 
action, and congressional purpose was only one element of the test.258 In 
Alexander v. Sandoval,259 the Rehnquist Court held that a private right of 
action would only be authorized if the text of the statute made it clear that 
Congress intended it to do so.260 At issue in Sandoval was the enforceability 
of a federal regulation implementing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
which prohibits race discrimination by recipients of federal funds.261 The 
Court invalidated a regulation which authorized suits to challenge 
government practices that had a discriminatory impact without requiring 
plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent.262 The Sandoval test, which requires 
statutory language authorizing a private right of action, effectively 
undermines the concept of implied private rights of action.263 Sandoval thus 
reduced the authority of federal courts to enforce federal statutes and had a 
devastating impact on civil rights litigation.264 
Along with limiting access to federal courts by civil rights plaintiffs, 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts erected new barriers to those claims. Those 
Courts vigorously enforced the justiciability limits on federal litigation, 
reversing the Warren Court’s trend towards loosening those requirements. 
For example, in Allen v. Wright,265 the Court held that black school children 
lacked standing to sue the Internal Revenue Service for its failure to enforce 
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laws denying tax-exempt status to private schools that discriminated on the 
basis of race.266 Racially discriminatory private schools facilitated white 
flight out of desegregated public schools, undermining the desegregation 
effort and denying the school-children plaintiffs the access to a desegregated 
education to which they were entitled under Brown.267 However, the Court 
held that the plaintiffs had not established the causation required for them to 
have standing to bring the suit.268 In other cases, the Court imposed barriers 
to Congress establishing standing by authorizing citizen suits,269 and made it 
virtually impossible for plaintiffs to seek injunction relief against abusive 
police practices.270 Finally, the Court developed a broad doctrine of official 
immunity which bars recovery by a significant number of civil rights 
plaintiffs.271 
Suits brought by private individuals are crucial to the adequate 
enforcement of federal law.272 Private enforcement is especially critical to 
civil rights enforcement.273 Due to the sheer volume of civil rights 
violations, even the most avid Department of Justice (DOJ) is unable to 
meet even a fraction of the need for lawsuits enforcing those rights.274 
Depending on who the President selects as Attorney General, the DOJ might 
not bring any civil rights suits at all.275 Court rulings restricting private rights 
of action and imposing enhanced justiciability barriers thus severely 
undermine the enforcement of civil rights, betraying the promise of 
Cooper.276 
However, perhaps the most consequential Supreme Court rulings 
restricting civil rights litigation were those enforcing sovereign and official 
immunity. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from 
exercising their diversity jurisdiction over states as defendants.277 Since the 
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late nineteenth century case of Hans v. Louisiana,278 the Court has read the 
Eleventh Amendment more broadly, as prohibiting all suits for damages 
against states.279 However, the Court established a huge exception to 
sovereign immunity in the 1908 case of Ex parte Young,280 holding that the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits for injunctive relief against state 
officials.281 In cases such as Brown and Cooper, the Warren Court relied in 
part on Ex parte Young and simply glossed over sovereign immunity 
issues.282 In the 1970s, however, members of the Court began to express 
concern that civil rights lawsuits were intruding on state sovereignty. Both 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts relied on sovereign immunity to restrict the 
scope of civil rights suits against state governments. 
In the 1974 case of Edelman v. Jordan,283 the Court held that sovereign 
immunity barred courts from awarding retroactive relief, such as the 
payment of welfare benefits wrongly denied to plaintiffs.284 In Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital v. Halderman,285 the Court held that sovereign 
immunity barred federal courts from awarding injunctive relief based on 
state law.286 Edelman and Pennhurst significantly restricted the remedies 
available to plaintiffs suing state governments, including civil rights cases. 
Moreover, the Rehnquist Court expanded the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity well beyond anything the Court had ever recognized before. Until 
1996, Congress had broad power to make federal rights enforceable against 
state governments by abrogating sovereign immunity.287 In Seminole Tribe 
of Florida v. Florida,288 the Court struck down a provision of the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act which authorized Indian tribes to sue states in 
disputes over gambling on tribal lands.289 The Court held that Congress 
could not use its power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate sovereign 
immunity.290 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated a 
broad view of state sovereignty, stating that “the background principle of 
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state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so 
ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area . . . under 
the exclusive control of the federal government.”291 State sovereignty 
trumped the federal rights at issue in the case, and Congress could not do 
anything about it. In a series of cases following Seminole Tribe, the Court 
struck down provisions of several civil rights statutes authorizing suits 
against state governments.292 In these remarkable rulings, the Court no 
longer relied on judicial supremacy to protect civil rights. Instead, the Court 
relied on judicial supremacy to limit Congress’s power to define and protect 
federal rights. 
In addition, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts established a broad rule 
on official immunity which poses a significant barrier to civil rights 
litigation. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,293 the Court held that officials could not be 
sued for some discretionary acts because they had immunity from such 
suits.294 In subsequent cases, the Court clarified that officials are immune 
from suit if they reasonably relied on clearly established legal rules when 
making the decisions that were the subject of the suit.295 Moreover, official 
immunity applies unless a plaintiff can show with particularity that the 
official’s action was clearly unreasonable and violated clearly established 
law.296 The Court’s qualified immunity doctrine imposes a significant barrier 
to plaintiffs prevailing in civil rights actions, greatly limiting the authority of 
federal courts to remedy civil rights violations.297 
C. Superior and Skeptical: Cooper Supremacy and the Roberts Court 
(2005 to present) 
The second prong of Cooper supremacy is the view that the Supreme 
Court has a special relationship with the Constitution that makes its 
constitutional interpretation superior to that of state officials. While the 
Warren Court was reluctant to invoke judicial supremacy against the other 
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federal branches, the current Supreme Court is not so reluctant. 
Unfortunately, rather than invoking judicial supremacy to protect civil 
rights, the Court now invokes it to restrict the ability of the political 
branches to do so. In its affirmative action cases, this Court has overturned 
political measures intended to remedy past discrimination against discrete 
and insular minorities.298 In cases restricting Congress’s power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has struck down federal legislation 
protecting minorities and made it more difficult for Congress to enact 
further legislation.299 These cases prevent the political branches from using 
the law to remedy the historical impact of prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities. 
1. Curtailing Affirmative Action 
Under the current leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts, the 
Supreme Court has subjected all measures intended to benefit minorities to 
the most stringent strict scrutiny and to the highest level of skepticism.300 
Perhaps the most significant such case was Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,301 in which the Court struck down 
policies of local school boards that took race into account to prevent the 
segregation of public schools.302 In an opinion written by Chief Justice 
Roberts, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the plans.303 The Court rejected 
the arguments of the local school boards of Seattle, Washington and 
Louisville, Kentucky, that the plans could be justified as a means to prevent 
segregation in the schools.304 Chief Justice Roberts ended the opinion with 
the observation that “[b]efore Brown, schoolchildren were told where they 
could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.”305 Roberts 
equated the segregationist laws of the Jim Crow South with the Seattle and 
Louisville school officials who hoped to combat segregation, concluding, 
“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating 
on the basis of race.”306 
The Court’s decision in Parents Involved turned the principles of 
Brown and Cooper on their heads. As Justice Stevens observed in his 
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dissent, “There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reliance on [Brown]. . . 
. The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who 
were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white 
children struggling to attend black schools.”307 In Brown and Cooper, the 
Court’s intervention in democratically elected state and local governments 
was justified by the fact that the Court was protecting minorities against the 
tyranny of the majority.308 In Parents Involved, however, the majority had 
elected to act to protect minorities, and the Court used its power to stop 
them. 
2. Restricting Congressional Power to Protect Civil Rights 
The Warren Court generally treated the other federal branches with 
deference. Most problematically, however, the current Court has relied on 
judicial supremacy to prevent the other federal branches from acting. The 
Court’s skepticism about congressional power to protect civil rights dates 
back to the Rehnquist Court’s ruling in the case of City of Boerne v. 
Flores.309 In Boerne, the Court struck down a provision of the 1993 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act which authorized suits against state 
governments.310 Congress had relied on its Section 5 power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact that provision.311 In Katzenbach v. 
Morgan,312 the Warren Court had applied a deferential rational basis test to 
evaluate Congress’s use of its Section 5 power.313 In Boerne, however, the 
Rehnquist Court articulated a new test, a restrictive “congruence and 
proportionality” test to limit congressional attempts to remedy 
discrimination by enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.314 Anything else 
would intrude on the Court’s power to articulate constitutional meaning. As 
in Cooper, the Court cited Marbury v. Madison, saying that “[t]he judicial 
authority to determine the constitutionality of laws . . . is based on the 
premise that the ‘powers of the legislature are defined and limited. . . .’”315 
In Morgan, the Court expressed a willingness to defer to Congress 
when it upheld a provision of the VRA that was arguably inconsistent with 
the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.316 However, in 
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Boerne, the Court said, “If Congress could define its own powers by altering 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 
‘superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.’”317 While not 
expressly overruling Morgan, the Court in Boerne imposed the strictest test 
to evaluate Congress’s power to define and protect civil rights. In cases 
applying the congruence and proportionality test, the Court made it clear 
that Congress is prohibited from creating broader rights than those 
established by the Court.318 
Following Boerne, the Roberts Court issued one of the Court’s most 
regressive rulings in years relating to minority rights since the Brown era, 
Shelby County v. Holder.319 In Shelby County, the Court struck down a key 
provision of the VRA. At issue was Section 5 of the Act, which required 
electoral districts that had a history of discriminating against minorities to 
obtain federal preclearance before adopting voting regulations which might 
limit the voting rights of minorities.320 The Court held that Section 5 was no 
longer justified because it was based on past history, not current reality.321 
Almost immediately after the Court issued its ruling, the North Carolina and 
Texas legislatures enacted voter identification legislation that had previously 
failed the preclearance process.322 Instead of improving the political process 
that had repeatedly failed minorities, the Court’s opinion in Shelby County 
created barriers to congressional attempts to fix that process. In Shelby 
County, the Roberts Court used Cooper supremacy to limit the power of 
majorities to enact legislation protecting minorities. In the hands of the 
Roberts Court, Cooper supremacy poses a threat, not a promise, to 
minorities seeking political empowerment and racial justice. 
3. Politicizing the Court 
When the Warren Court decided the cases of Brown and Cooper, many 
Southern politicians, and some scholars, accused the Court of engaging in 
inappropriate political activism.323 In 1968, Richard Nixon capitalized on the 
criticism of Warren Court rulings in his successful campaign for the 
presidency, and he appointed judges who retreated from the Warren Court’s 
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“judicial activism.”324 Over time, however, Brown and Cooper have gained 
supporters. Brown is now widely revered as one of the high marks in the 
history of the Court.325 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a successful nominee 
to the Supreme Court who does not embrace the Court’s ruling in Brown. 
However, since Brown and Cooper, it is undeniable that judicial 
nominations, especially those to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
have been increasingly politicized. 
The 2000 case of Bush v. Gore326 was a landmark case in the 
politicization of the Court. In that case, the Court decided the 2000 election 
on a partisan vote, electing the candidate who won a minority of the popular 
vote.327 The Court ignored the provision of the Constitution that authorized 
the House of Representatives to decide such elections.328 The outcome 
would likely have been the same, since Republicans held the House at the 
time, but the Court’s decision politicized the Court and damaged its 
legitimacy.329 
More recently, the Court has increased in its continued pattern of 
politicization. When Justice Scalia died in the last year of Barack Obama’s 
presidency, the Republican Senate refused to consider the President’s 
nominee Merrick Garland.330 Despite the fact that Judge Garland was 
eminently qualified, the Senate left the seat open for over a year.331 When 
President Donald J. Trump was elected, the Senate dropped the filibuster for 
Supreme Court nominees, and for the first time a Supreme Court Justice, 
Neil Gorsuch, was confirmed on a narrow party-line vote.332 In 2018, after 
Justice Kennedy retired from the Court, the Senate rushed through a 
controversial nominee, Brett Kavanaugh, without a chance to thoroughly vet 
him.333 Like Gorsuch, Kavanaugh was confirmed on a narrow party-line 
vote.334 Today, the Supreme Court is widely viewed as a political court 
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without limits on its power.335 Sadly, the politicization of the Court may be 
an unintended consequence of Cooper supremacy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Footnote four in Carolene Products justified Court intervention in the 
political process to protect the rights of minorities. The rationale behind 
footnote four suggests that when minorities win in the political process, their 
victories are entitled to deference. These two principles define Cooper 
supremacy and guided the Warren Court. Over the years, however, judicial 
supremacy has evolved, threatening the attempts of elected officials to 
defend and protect minority rights. Notwithstanding the good faith of the 
Court that decided Cooper v. Aaron, the judicial supremacy that it 
established is a troubled legacy at best, and at worst, a dangerous legacy for 
the cause of racial justice in this country. 
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